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Abstract. We present the extended notion of pure exchange econom $\mathrm{y}$
under uncertainty, called an economy with awa.ren $ess$ structur\^e where
each trader having a strictly monotone preference makes decision un-
der $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ awareness and belief, and we introduce a generalized no-
tion of equilibrium for the economy, called an expectations equilibrium
in awareness. We show the existence theorem of the equilibrium and the
fundamental welfare theorem for the economy, $\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}_{)}$. an allocation in the
economy is $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto optimal if and only if it is an expectations
equilibrium allocation in awareness.
1 Introduction
This article relates economies and distributed belief. We shall present a gener-
alized notion of economy und er uncertainty, called an economy with awareness
struc rure where each trader makes decision in $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ awareness and belief un-
der incomplete information. The purposes are: $\mathrm{F}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}_{)}$ to introduce an extended
notion of expectations equilibrium for the economy, called an expectations equz-
librium in awareness. Secondly, to show the fundamental welfare theorem for
the extended economy under expectations equilibrium in awareness.
Main Theorem. In $0$, pure exchange economy under uncertainty, the traders
are assumed to have an atnaren $ess$ structure and they are risk averse. Then
an allocation in the economy is $ex$-ante Pareto optimal if and only if it is an
expectations equilibrium allocation in awareness for some initial endowment with
respect to some price system.
In Economic theory and its related fields, many authors have investigated
several notions of equilibrium in an economy under asymmetric information.l
They have studied the relationships between these equilibrium concepts (e.g.:
The existence theorem of equilibrium, the core equivalence theorem and the no
trade theorem etc.) One of the serious limitations of their analysis is to assume
$\star$ Partially supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)(2)(No.14540145)
in the Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences.
1 See the literatures cited in F. Forges, E. Minelli, and R. Vohla, Incentive and the




‘partition’ structure as information the traders receive. From the epistemic point
of view, the partition structure represents the traders’ knowledge satisfying the
postulates: (Truth’ $\mathrm{T}$ (what is known is true), the ‘positive introspection’ 4
(that we know what we do) and the ‘negative introspection’ 5 (that we know
what we do not know). The postulate 5 is indeed so strong th at describes the
hyper-rationality of traders, and thus it is particularly objectionable.
This raises the question to what extent results on the information parti-
tion structure (or the equivalent postulates of knowledge). The answer is to
strengthen the results: We shall weaken the conditions in the partition. This
relaxation can potentially yield important results in a world with imperfectly
Bayesian agents.
The idea has been performed in different settings. Geanakoplos [5] showed the
no speculation theorem in the extended rational expectations equilibrium under
the assumption that the information structure is reflexive, transitive and nested.
The condition ’nestedness’ is interpreted as a requisite on the ’mem $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{y}^{?}$ of the
trader. Einy et al [4] extended the core equivalence theorem of Aum ann [1] to
the equivalence theorem between the $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{x}$-post core and the rational expectations
equilibria for an economy under asymm etric information. Recenltly, Matsuhisa [6]
gives an extension of the theorem into an economy under awareness structure.
In his line we establish the fund amental theorem for welfare into the generalized
economy.
This article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we propose the model: An
economy with awareness structure and an expectations equilibrium in awareness.
In Section 3 we state explicitly the fundamental theorem for welfare economics
and sketch the proof. Finally we conclude by remarks.
2 The Model
Let $\Omega$ be a non-empty finite set called a state space and $2^{\Omega}$ the field
$2^{\Omega}$ consisting
of all subsets of $\Omega$ . Each member of $2^{\Omega}$ i $\mathrm{s}$ called an event and each element of
$\Omega$
called a state. We denote by $T$ the set of the traders. We shall present a model
of awareness according to E. Dekel et al $[3].2$
2.1 Awareness, Belief and Information
A belief structure is a tuple $\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ in which $B_{t}$ :
$2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{\Omega}$ is trader $t’ \mathrm{s}$
belief operator. The interpretation of the event $B_{t}E$ is that
$‘ t$ believes E.’ An
awareness structure is a tuple $\langle$ $\Omega$ , {At)ter, $(Bt)_{\mathrm{f}\in}\tau\rangle$ in which $\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ is $\mathrm{a}$
belief structure and $A_{t}$ is $t’ \mathrm{s}$ awareness operator on
$2^{\Omega}$ defined by
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{L}$ $A_{t}E=B_{t}E\cup B_{t}$ $(\Omega \backslash B_{t}E)$ for every $E$ in $2^{\Omega}$ .
2 A different approach of awareness models is discussed in R. Fagin, J.Y. Halpern,
Y. Moses and M.Y. Vardi, Reasoning about Knowledge. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Lond on, England, 1995
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The interpretation of $\mathrm{A}_{t}E$ is that $‘ t$ is aware of E.’ The property PL says that
$t$ is aware of $E$ if he believes it or if he believes that he does not believe it.
We shall give the generalized notion of inform ation partition in the line of
$\mathrm{B}$acharach [2] as follows.
Definition 1. The associated information structure $(P_{t})_{t\in T}$ with awareness struc-
ture $\langle$ $\Omega$ , $(A_{t})$ , $(B_{t}))$ is the class of $t’ \mathrm{s}$ associated information functions $P_{t}$ : $\Omegaarrow$
$2^{\Omega}$ defined by Pt (co) $= \bigcap_{E\in 2^{\Omega}}\{E|\omega \in B_{t}E\}$ . (If there is no event $E$ for which
$\omega$ $\in B_{t}E$ then we take Pt (w) to be undefined.) We denote by $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathrm{P}_{t})$ the set
$\{\omega\in\Omega |P_{t}(\omega)\neq\emptyset\}$ , called the domain of $P_{t}$ .
The mapping $P_{t}$ is called reflexive if:
Ref $\iota v$ $\in P_{t}(\omega)$ for every $\omega$ $\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ ,
and it is said to be transitive if:
:Rn $\xi\in P_{t}(\omega)$ implies $P_{t}(\xi)\subseteq P_{t}(\omega)$ for any $\xi$ , $\omega$ $\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathrm{P}_{t})$ .
Furthermore $P_{t}$ is called syrnrnetric if:
Sym $\xi\in$ $P_{t}$ $(\omega)$ implies $P_{t}(\xi)\ni\omega$ for any $\omega$ and $\xi\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{f})$ .
Remark 1. M. Bacharach [2] introduces the strong epistemic model equivalent
to the Kripke sem antics of the modal logic S5. The strong epistemic model is a
tuple $\langle\Omega, (I\mathrm{f}_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ in which $t^{7}\mathrm{s}$ knowledge operator $I\zeta_{l}$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{\Omega}$ satisfies the
five postulates; For every $E_{7}F$ of $2^{\Omega}$ ,
$\mathrm{N}K_{t}\Omega=\Omega$ , $\mathrm{K}$ $K_{t}(E\cap F\grave{)}=K_{t}E\cap KtF$ $\mathrm{T}$ $K_{t}F\subseteq F$ ;
4 $K_{t}F\underline{\subseteq}K_{t}K_{t}F$ , 5 $\Omega$ $\backslash K_{t}F\underline{\subseteq}K_{t}(\Omega\backslash K_{t}F)$ .
$tfs$ associated information function $P_{t}$ induced by $K_{t}$ makes a partition of $\Omega$ ,
called $t’ \mathrm{s}$ information partition, which satisfies the postulates Ref, Trn and
Sym. This is just the Kripke semantics corresponding to the logic S5,$\cdot$ the pos-
tulates Ref, Trn and Sym are respectively equivalent to the postulates $\mathrm{T}$ , 4
and 5. The strong epistemic model can be interpreted as the awareness struc-
ture $\langle\Omega, (A_{t}), (B_{t})\rangle$ such that $B_{t}$ is the knowledge operator. In this situation it
is easily verified that $A_{t}$ must be the trivial $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}_{1}^{3}$ and that $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})=\Omega$ .
2.2 Economy with Awareness Structure
A pure exchange economy under uncertainty is a structure
$\mathcal{E}=\langle T, \Omega, \mathrm{e}(\}U_{t})_{t\in T}, (\pi_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$
consisting of the following structure and interpretations: There are $l$ commod ities
in each state of the state space $\Omega$ ; the consumption set of each trader $t$ is $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}\mathrm{i}$
an initial endowment is a mapping $\mathrm{e}$ : $T\mathrm{x}$ $\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ with which $\mathrm{e}(t, \cdot)$ : $\Omegaarrow$
$\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ i $\mathrm{s}$ called $t’ \mathrm{s}$ initial endowment ; $U_{t}$ : $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{f}\rangle$( $\Omega$ $arrow \mathrm{R}$ is $t’ \mathrm{s}$ von-Neumann
and Morgenstern utility function; $\pi_{t}$ is a subjective prior on $\Omega$ for $t\in T$ . For
simplicity, $\pi_{t}$ is assumed to be full support for all $t\in T$ . That is, $\pi_{t}(\omega)\neq 0$ for
every $\omega\in\Omega$ .
3 I. $\mathrm{e}$ . $A_{t}(F)$ $=\Omega$ for every $F\in 2^{\Omega}$
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Definition 2. A pure exchange economy with awareness structure is a structure
$\mathcal{E}^{A}=\langle \mathcal{E}, (A_{t})_{t\in T}, (B_{t})_{t\in T_{2}}(P_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ , in which $\mathcal{E}$ is a pure exchange economy
under uncertainty, and $\langle\Omega, (A_{t})_{t\in T}, (B_{t})_{t\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ is an awareness structure
with $(P_{t})_{t\in T}$ th e associated information structure. By the domain of the economy
$\mathcal{E}^{A}$ we mean $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})=\bigcap_{t\in T}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ . We always assume that $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})\neq$ GO.
Remark 2. An economy under asymmetric information is an economy $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ with
the awareness structure $\langle\Omega, (A_{t})_{t\in T}, (B_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ given by the strong epistemic model,
and that $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})=\Omega$ .
We denote by $\mathcal{F}_{t}$ the field of $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ generated by $\{P_{t}(\omega)|\omega\in\Omega\}$ and denote
by $\Pi_{t}(\omega)$ the atom containing $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ . We denote by $\mathcal{F}$ the join of all
Tt $(\mathrm{t}\in T)$ on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ ; i.e. $\mathcal{F}=\bigvee_{t\in T}\mathcal{F}_{t}$ , and denote by $\{\Pi(\omega)|\omega \in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})\}$
the set of all atoms $\Pi(\omega)$ containing $\omega$ of the field $\mathcal{F}=\bigvee_{t\in T}\mathcal{F}_{t}$ . We shall often
refer to the following conditions: For every $t\in T$ ,
A-l $\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}(\mathrm{t}, \omega)>0$ for each $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ .
A-2 $\mathrm{e}(t, \cdot)$ is $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on Dom $(P_{t})$ .
A-3 For each $x\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ , the function $U_{t}(x, \cdot)$ is at least $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A}))$
and the function: $T\mathrm{x}$ $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}arrow \mathrm{R}$ , $(t, x)\mapsto U_{t}(x, \omega)$ is $2^{\Omega}\mathrm{x}$ $B$-measurable where
$B$ is the $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{r}$-field of all Borel subsets of $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ .
A-4 For each ci $\in\Omega$ , the function $U_{t}$ $(\cdot, \omega)$ is strictly increasing on $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ , contin-
uous, strictly quasi-concave and non-satiated on $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l.4}$
2.3 Expectations Equilibrium in Awareness
An assignment is a mapping $\mathrm{x}$ : $T\cross$ $\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ such that for each $t\in T$ , the
function $\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot)$ is at least $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ . We denote by $Ass(\mathcal{E}^{A})$
the set of all assignments for the economy $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ . By an allocation we mean an
assignment a such that $\mathrm{a}(t, \cdot)$ is $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ for all $t\in T$ and
$\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{a}(t, \omega)\leq\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}(t, \omega)$ for every $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ . We denote by $Alc(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ the set of
all allocations.
We introduce the revised notion of trad er’s expectation of utility in
$\mathcal{E}^{A}$ . By $t^{\}}\mathrm{s}$
ex-ante expectation we mean $\mathrm{E}_{t}[Ut(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot)]$ $:= \sum_{\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})}U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \omega),$ $\omega)\pi_{t}(\omega)$
for each $\mathrm{x}\in Ass(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ . The interirn expectation $\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{t}}[U_{l}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot)|P_{l}]$ is defined
by $\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot)|P_{t}](\omega):=\sum_{\xi\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})}U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \xi),$ $\xi)\pi_{t}(\{\xi\}\cap A_{t}(\{\xi\})|P_{\mathrm{t}}(\omega))$ on
$\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{\mathrm{t}})$ . It should be noted that we use not the usual notion of posterior
$\pi_{t}(\{\xi\}|P_{l}(\omega))$ but the revised one $\pi_{t}(\{\xi\}\cap Af (\{\xi\})|Pt(\omega)).5$
A price system is a non-zero function $p:\Omega$ $arrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ which is $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on
$\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ . We denote by $\mathrm{A}(\mathrm{p})$ the partition on $\Omega$ induced by $p$ ) and denote by
$\sigma(p)$ the field of $\Omega$ generated by $\Delta(p)$ . The budget set of a trader $t$ at a state
$\omega$ for a price system $p$ is defined by $B_{f}(\omega,p):=\{x\in \mathrm{R}^{l}+|p(\omega)\cdot$ $x\leq p(\omega)$
.
4 That is, for any $x\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ there exists an $x’\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ such that $U_{\mathrm{t}}(x’,\omega)>U_{i}(x,\omega)$ .
5 A discussion why this improvement of the notion of posterior is needed is given in
T. Matsiihisa and S.-S. Usami, Autareness, belief and agreeing to disagree, Far East
Journal of Mathematical Sciences $2(6)$ $(2000)$ 833-844
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$\mathrm{e}(t, \omega)$ $\}$ . Define the mapping $\Delta(p)\cap P_{t}$ : $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})arrow 2^{\Omega}$ by $(\Delta(p)\cap Pt)(\omega):=$
$\Delta(p)(\omega)\cap$ Pt (w).). We denote by Dom (Zi (p) $\cap P_{t}$ ) the set of all states $\omega$ in which
$\Delta(p)(\omega)\cap P_{\mathrm{t}}(\omega)\neq\emptyset$. Let $\sigma(p)\vee \mathcal{F}_{t}$ be the smallest a-field containing both the
fields $\sigma(p)$ and $\mathcal{F}_{t}$ .
Definition 3. An expectations equilibrium in awareness for an economy $\mathcal{E}^{A}$
with awareness structure is a pair $(p, \mathrm{x})$ , in which $p$ is a price system and $\mathrm{x}$ is
an assignment satisfying the following conditions:
EAI $\mathrm{x}$ is an allocation;
EA2 For all $t\in T$ and for every $\omega\in\Omega_{7}\mathrm{x}(t, \omega)\in B_{t}(\omega,p),\cdot$
EA3 For all $t\in T$ , if $\mathrm{y}(t, \cdot)$ : $E\mathit{2}arrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ is $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ with
$\mathrm{y}(t, \omega)\in B_{l}(\omega, p)$ for all $\omega\in\Omega$ , then
$\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot))|\Delta(p)\cap P_{t}](\omega)\geq \mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{y}(t, \cdot))|\Delta(p)\cap Pt](\omega)$
pointwise on Dom $(\Delta(p)\cap P_{t})$ ;
EA4 For every $\omega\in$ Dom$(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ , $\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{x}(t, \omega)=\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}(t, \omega)$ .
The allocation $\mathrm{x}$ in $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ is called an expectations equilibrium allocation in aware-
ness for $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ .
We denote by $EA(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ the set of all the expectations equilibria of a pure exchange
econom$\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}$ $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ , and denote by $A(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ the set of all the expectations equilibrium
allocations in awareness for the economy.
3 The Result
Let $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ be the economy with awareness structure ancl $\mathcal{E}^{A}(\omega)$ the economy with
complete information $\langle T, (\mathrm{e}(t, \omega))_{t\in T_{7}}(U_{t}(\cdot, \omega))_{t\in T}\rangle$ for each $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ . We denote
by $\mathcal{W}(\mathcal{E}^{A}(\omega))$ the set of all competitive equilibria for $\mathcal{E}^{A}(\omega)$ .
An allocation $\mathrm{x}$ in $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ is said to be $ex$-ante Pareto-optimal if there is no
allocation a such that $\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{a}(t_{7}\cdot))]\geq \mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot))]$ for all $t\in T$ with at least
one inequality strict. We can now state our main theorem.
Theorem 1. Let $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ be an economy with awareness structure satisfying the co7l-
ditions A-l, A-2, A-3 and A-4. An allocation is $ex$-ante Pareto optimal if and
only if it is an expectations equilibrium allocation in awareness for some ini-
that endowment $\mathrm{w}$ with respect to some price system such that $\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{w}(t, \omega)=$
$\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}(t, \omega)$ for each $\omega$ $\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ .
Proof. Follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2 as below.
Proposition 1. Let $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ be an economy with awareness structure satisfying the
conditions $\mathrm{A}-1_{f}$ A-2; A-3 and A-4. Then an allocation x is $ex$-arrte Pareto
optim$nal$ if it is an expectations equilibrium allocation in awareness with respect
to some price system. $\square$
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Proposition 2. Lei $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ be an economy with awareness structure satisfying the
conditions $\mathrm{A}-1_{J}$ A-2; A-3 and A-4. If an allocation $\mathrm{x}$ is ex-ante Pareto opte-
$maf$ in $\mathcal{E}^{A}$ then there are a price system and an initial endowment
$\mathrm{e}’$ such that
$\mathrm{x}$ is an expectations $equil\iota$brium allocation in awareness with $\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}’(t, \omega)=$
$\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}(t, \omega)$ for each to $\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{A})$ .
$\square$
4 Concluding Remarks
Our real concern in this article is about relationship between players’ beliefs
and their decision making, especially when and how the players take corporate
actions under their decisions. We focus on extending the fund amental theorem
of welfare economics into an economy with traders having ‘awareness and belief’
model We have shown that the nature of the theorem is dependent not on
common-belief nor on the partition structure of traders’ information, but on the
structure of awareness and belief when each player receives information.
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